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What do connectionnist simulations tell us? 
 
 In his review, Rispoli’s main concern is that Elman et al.’s book will aggravate 
the degree of polarisation in developmental psycholinguistics. I cannot really comment 
on this worry, as developmental psycholinguistics is not my field. Instead, I will discuss 
some questions more related to my background--the role of computational modelling in 
Elman et al.’s approach. 
 Elman et al.’s ambitious goal is to propose theories of cognitive development that 
are grounded in our knowledge of biology. This if of course what the great Jean Piaget 
tried to achieve during his lifetime—unsuccessfully, as we know. Elman et al.’s 
advantage over Piaget is that they have a set of computational tools, connectionnism, 
which both allows them to specify theories precisely and to study complex behaviours 
(such as epigenesis, where innate and environmental factors interact to create new 
levels of complexity) that are just beyond the (unaided) human mind. Even though I 
will highlight some of the weaknesses of their approach below, I should emphasise that 
reading their book was an exciting and enjoyable experience. 
 As noted by Rispoli, there are important problems with the simulations reported 
by Elman et al. Rispoli focuses on simulations of past tense acquisition and syntax 
acquisition, but the problems are by no means limited to these areas. I will briefly 
consider two recent developments in neural net research, one taken from the field of 
language acquisition, and one from elsewhere, which underscore some of the 
difficulties of the simulations discussed in the book.  
 The influential simulations reported first in Elman (1993), stressing the 
“importance of starting small”, play a significant role in the book, because they support 
one of its key ideas, that time-related constraints on perceptual capacity and memory 
capacity may facilitate the acquisition of language (or of other complex skills) in that 
they limit the search space faced by biological brains and by artificial neural networks. 
Elman found that a recurrent network could not acquire a simple, artificial grammar 
containing relative clauses when full sentences were given as input, but that it could do 
so either when the complexity of the input was increased gradually, short sentences 
being presented first, or when the temporal window with which the network could 
process information was limited to three or four words at the beginning and then 
progressively extended to its full size. However, Rohde and  Plaut (1997), using 
essentially the same type of recurrent network as Elman, were unable to replicate this 
finding. They found that their network could learn better when it was presented with 
full sentences than when presented with an incremental regime. They concluded that, if 
anything, delaying complex information was often an hindrance to the network. 
 The second example is taken from simulations of the balance beam task (a classic 
task in the developmental literature) first reported by McClelland and Jenkins (1991). 
These simulation occupy an important place in the book, because they show that a 
neural net using a continuous, non-linear learning function can display behaviour that 
looks stage-like and discontinuous. Unfortunately for this claim, however, Raijmakers, 
van Koten, and Molenaar (1996) have recently shown that the stage-wise behaviour of 
the network is an artefact of the measures used by McClelland and Jenkins. When a 
proper set of measures is employed, with strict criteria for assessing discontinuity 
(criteria based on the mathematical catastrophe theory) it was shown that the neural net 
displayed no sign of stage-like behaviour. 
 In general, the simulations in Elman et al. come out best when they explore the 
dynamics of neural networks for themselves, without reference to empirical data. When 
they try to simulate data, they are plagued by the many problems noted by Rispoli. In 
this respect, it is unfortunate that Elman et al. do not discuss alternative computational 
approaches, in particular adaptive production systems (e.g., Langley, 1987), which are, 
like neural nets, self-organising systems displaying non-linear behaviour. In doing so, 
they could have contrasted both the strengths and weaknesses of neural nets, and 
perhaps found leads for further research. An obvious domain where this ecumenical 
approach would have helped is high-level cognition, such as reasoning, planning, or 
scientific thinking, about which connectionism is mostly silent, as noted by Elman et al. 
themselves (p. 394). 
 It is somewhat disappointing that Rispoli does not discuss the emphasis given by 
the book to recent advances in developmental neurobiology, because these constitute a 
cornerstone of Elman et al.’s argument. I believe that Elman et al. are right to challenge 
what they call representational innateness, which plays a prominent role in 
developmental psychology in general (e.g. the work of Carey and Spelke), and in 
developmental psycholinguistics in particular (e.g. the work of Chomsky and Pinker). 
Their detailed criticism of the data supposed to support innate representations (cf. 
Chapter 7, where the matter is discussed with respect to language) and the evidence 
they adduce in favour of epigenesis (plasticity and equipotentiality of the brain, as well 
as the fact that the size of the human genome is not large enough to encode 
representational information) is compelling, although these questions are of course 
currently highly controversial in biology and in neuropsychology. Even so, their 
criticisms pose a welcome challenge to theoreticians who use “explanations” based on 
innate factors, but do not provide detailed mechanisms.   
 Elman et al.’s argument becomes much weaker when they claim that 
connectionism offers a satisfactory explanation for epigenesis, however. Most of the 
models discussed in the book abstract too much from biological complexity to make 
this claim plausible. This is the case even in Chapter 6, which attempts to focus 
specifically on biologically plausible models. In particular, the simulations on the 
importance of starting small (Elman, 1993) are discussed at length in this chapter, as 
they are used to illustrate the importance of chronotopic constraints in the development 
of natural and artificial networks. As noted above, however, Rohde and  Plaut (1997) 
were unable to replicate Elman’s findings, showing that starting with full complexity 
leads to better results.  
  Elman et al. offer a nice introduction to non-linear dynamics, to neural nets, and 
to recent developments in developmental neurobiology. The attempt to put these three 
fields together into a single research framework does not come out convincingly, 
however. I think that this failure is due both to the complexity of these fields taken 
individually, and to the fact that our knowledge of the biological basis of development 
does not (yet) offer the constraints hoped for. Given that the simulations reported in the 
book are sometimes not replicable and often do not account for the data satisfactorily--
which both are of course obvious requirements for a model or theory that calls itself 
successful--I have to agree with Rispoli that Elman et al.’s book must be taken more as 
a position statement than as a scientific breakthrough. 
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